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15 Years of the Handover: The Rise, Discontent,
and Positive Interaction of Cross-border
Arbitration in Hong Kong with Mainland
China
Weixia Gu1
Since the sovereignty handover and establishment of the Hong Kong
SAR in 1997, Hong Kong has faced the dual challenges of
balancing her need to facilitate a cross-border arbitration regime
which is compatible with Mainland China under the principle of
“one country, two systems”, and promoting herself as an
international arbitration center. The two goals are at times
incompatible, as accommodating the localized needs and standards
of Mainland China often requires Hong Kong courts to be more
“flexible” than established international arbitration standards
would allow. This Article attempts to give a comprehensive analysis
of the above problems. First, this Article surveys all the cases of the
enforcement of Mainland China arbitration awards in Hong Kong
courts since the handover to present the actual interpretation of the
standard of cross-border arbitration in Hong Kong with Mainland
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China. Second, from this comprehensive evaluation of the
enforcement landscape, this Article makes a macro-proposition over
the interaction between the Mainland China arbitral regime and the
Hong Kong courts, with the judgments of the Hong Kong courts
serving as a catalyst for improvements in the rules and practices of
the Mainland China arbitral authorities. This Article gives credit to
the proper type of interaction between the two sides, i.e. the positive
interaction trend where Mainland China arbitral authorities
reflecting on Hong Kong’s arbitral enforcement judgments, become
persuaded and incentivized to change their rules to cohere with the
high and internationally accepted arbitration standards that Hong
Kong maintains. This Article argues that “positive interaction” is
important to the cross-border arbitration development. Despite the
recent halt, or even reversal, of the positive interaction trend in
light of the Keeneye case, this Article argues that positive
interaction should be and is likely to be resumed, as Hong Kong
seeks to maintain its image as an international arbitration
powerhouse and Mainland China continues to modernize and
internationalize its arbitration system. In the long run, this
improved cross-border arbitration consensus will bring about the
healthy development of the legal cooperation between the two sides
and act as an engine for economic growth in the Greater China
region.
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INTRODUCTION
Arbitration has been a popular means of dispute resolution for
handling foreign business in both Hong Kong and Mainland China.2
Hong Kong has been a member of the 1958 United Nations
Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards (the “New York Convention”) since 1977, when, as the
then-British colony, the United Kingdom extended its application to
Hong Kong. In 1986, the People’s Republic of China acceded to the
New York Convention.3 Cross-border arbitration between the two
sides commenced in 1989 when the first award made by China
2

According to the CIETAC, foreign related arbitration cases it accepted reached the record
high in 2009 of 559. CIETAC Caseload Hits a Record High in 2009, CIETAC
NEWSLETTER
(Feb.
4,
2010),
http://www.cietac.org/index/newsletter/47690b6b38216b7f001.cms. In 2010, the 209
arbitration commissions in Mainland China accepted a total of 1219 foreign related
arbitration cases. Foreign-related Arbitration Identified as Key Priority of Arbitration
Service,
CIETAC
NEWSLETTER
(Sept.
23
2011),
http://www.cietac.org/index/newsletter/4772dbe48545837f001.cms.
3
China has made two reservations when agreeing to the New York Convention. First, it
only recognizes awards made by member states of the Convention; second, it only applies
the Convention provisions to conflicts arising from legal relationships, whether contractual
or not, that are considered commercial under PRC law.
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International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (the
“CIETAC”) in Beijing sought recognition and enforcement in Hong
Kong, and this marked the beginning of the cross-border arbitration
system in Hong Kong with Mainland China.4
Since the sovereignty handover in 1997, as the New York
Convention could no longer apply within one sovereign State, the
cross-border arbitration scheme and mutual enforcement regime
based on the Convention ceased to have effect between the two
jurisdictions. To fill in the post-handover legal lacuna, the Supreme
People’s Court of Mainland China and the Department of Justice of
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (the “SAR”) signed
an Arrangement on Mutual Recognition and Enforcement of
Arbitral Awards (the “Mutual Arrangement”) between Mainland
China and Hong Kong under the “one country, two systems”
principle. 5 Under the Mutual Arrangement, Article 7 provides a
number of grounds for refusal of enforcement of arbitral awards
from the other side, which are similar to those listed in Article V of
the New York Convention.6 A matter that has created much debate
and speculation over the past fifteen years, however, concerns the
different understanding of the “public policy” ground at both sides
and in association, the level of standard of review of the Mainland
China arbitral awards in Hong Kong.7 Claims on this ground are
particularly easy to make and, as Hong Kong and Mainland China
obviously hold on to different legal systems and ideologies, an
arbitration which has been conducted according to Mainland China
standards may easily be impeached under public policy grounds by
applying a more stringent common law standard in Hong Kong.
After the establishment of the Hong Kong SAR in 1997,
particularly after the promulgation of the Mutual Arrangement in
4

Xian Chu Zhang, Enforcement of Arbitral Awards between Mainland China and Hong
Kong: Before and After Reunification, in THE NEW LEGAL ORDER IN HONG KONG 192, 192
(Raymond Wacks ed., 1999).
5
Arrangement Concerning Mutual Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards
between Mainland China and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, June 21,
1999,
available
at
http://www.legislation.gov.hk/intracountry/eng/pdf/mainlandmutual2e.pdf
[hereinafter
Mutual Arrangement].
6
Id. art. 7; see United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards art. V, June 10, 1958, 303 U.N.T.S. 4739 [hereinafter New York
Convention].
7
See generally Gu Weixia, Recourse against Arbitral Awards: How Far Can a Court Go?
Supportive and Supervisory Role of Hong Kong Courts as Lessons to Mainland China
Arbitration, 4 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 481, 481-500 (2005).
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1999, Hong Kong has had to face the dual challenges of finding her
place in the new cross-border arbitration order and leading the newborn SAR forward in becoming a regional and international
arbitration center. For reasons of comity between the two
jurisdictions and the unreasonableness of requiring Mainland China
arbitrations to adhere to the strict standards of Hong Kong law and
practice, Hong Kong courts have long since closely scrutinized all
public policy claims challenging Mainland China awards seeking
enforcement in Hong Kong, and have placed a high threshold of
requiring the alleged infringement to be fundamental to Hong
Kong’s sense of justice and morality. 8 Delicate issues of Hong
Kong’s cross-border arbitration relationship with Mainland China
have arisen, which often underscore the legal conflicts between the
two sides.9 On one hand, there is a need to foster the modernization
of Mainland China towards the higher international standards of
arbitration which Hong Kong seeks to maintain, whilst on the other
hand, in association with the sovereignty change, there is the
practical need to facilitate a cross-border arbitration regime which is
compatible with Mainland China under the principles of “one
country, two systems” and closer economic cooperation. Therefore,
a more flexible approach in reviewing Mainland China’s arbitral
awards is needed in order to maintain the viability of cross-border
transactions. Caught in this quagmire, it is challenging for Hong
Kong courts to decide what standards they should require of
Mainland China arbitration.
This Article attempts to give a comprehensive analysis of the
above problems and make two contributions. First, this Article
surveys all the cases of the enforcement of Mainland China
arbitration awards by the Hong Kong SAR courts since the 1997
handover to present the actual interpretation of the standard of
cross-border arbitration in Hong Kong with Mainland China. In
association with the case review, this Article compiles a series of
tables on basis of the data collected at the Hong Kong International
Arbitration Center, which consolidates the numbers of cases
received by the Hong Kong courts where enforcement of the
Mainland China awards are sought in Hong Kong, the rate of
8

See Hebei Imp. & Exp. Corp. v. Polytek Eng’g Co., [1999] 2 H.K.C.F.A.R. 111, 117-18
(C.F.A.) (discussing public policy considerations).
9
For an introduction of the arbitration system in Mainland China, see GU WEIXIA,
ARBITRATION IN CHINA: REGULATION OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND PRACTICAL
ISSUES (Sweet & Maxwell eds., 2012).
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challenges to enforcement, and the rate of such challenges being
successful. The cases are collected from the 1997 handover (July
1st) till the end of 2012, covering a period of approximately fifteen
years.
Second, from this comprehensive evaluation of the enforcement
landscape, this Article makes a macro-proposition and identifies a
healthy and welcome interaction trend between the Mainland China
arbitration regime and the Hong Kong courts where the judgments
of the Hong Kong courts serve as a catalyst for improvements in the
rules and practices of the Mainland China arbitral authorities. This
Article gives credit to such proper type of interaction, i.e. the
positive interaction, which this Article defines as the phenomenon
or trend where Mainland China arbitral authorities, reflecting on
Hong Kong arbitral enforcement judgments, become persuaded and
incentivized to change their rules and practices to cohere with the
high and internationally accepted arbitration standards that Hong
Kong maintains. This Article argues that “positive interaction” is
important to the cross-border arbitration and judicial assistance
development. Despite the recent halt, or even reversal, of the
positive interaction trend in light of the Keeneye case,10 this Article
argues that positive interaction should be and is likely to be resumed,
as Hong Kong seeks to maintain its image as an international
arbitration powerhouse and Mainland China continues to modernize
and internationalize its arbitration system. In the long run, this
improved cross-border arbitration consensus will bring about the
healthy development of the legal cooperation between the two sides
and act as an engine for economic growth in the Greater China
region.
Structurally, this Article is divided into five parts. Following
this Introduction, Part II gives a detailed historical account of the
current cross-border arbitration system between Hong Kong and
Mainland China. The historical review is intended to compare the
pre-handover cross-border arbitral relation between Hong Kong and
Mainland China with that of the post-handover, and to give a
historical background of the dual challenges that Hong Kong faces
in balancing a cross-border arbitration regime with Mainland China
today. In Part III, the Article examines all of the Mainland China
arbitration awards seeking enforcement in Hong Kong since the
1997 sovereignty handover, in order to give a consolidated view of
10

Gao Haiyan v. Keeneye Holdings Ltd. (Keeneye II), [2012] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 627 (C.A.).
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the development of cross-border arbitration jurisprudence. Doctrinal
research and law and development studies are mainly adopted in
Part III for going over the cases and associated literatures
commenting on the cases. This Part tracks down the jurisprudence,
discourse, and development of cross-border arbitration in Hong
Kong with Mainland China both before and after the handover. By
comparing post-handover arbitral enforcement cases in Hong Kong
with respect to Mainland China to those preceding the handover,
Part III also provides a consolidated view of the law and
development in the field. Part IV analyzes the trend on cross-border
arbitration between the two jurisdictions over one and a half
decades. It argues how the Hong Kong jurisprudence has helped
shape the cross-border arbitration regime over the years by
encouraging “positive interaction” at the Mainland China side. It
then explains that the recent case of Keeneye may have caused a halt
in such positive interaction. Moreover, Part IV gives credit to
positive interaction as the prospective law and policy direction for
judicial assistance development between the two sides. Part V wraps
up the Article with conclusions. The author opines that the Keeneye
case could be an unfortunate development and offers reflections of
why positive interaction should be resumed and continued. Part V
also discusses some other contributions this Article might bring to
the literature.

THE LEGAL PARADIGM OF CROSS-BORDER
ARBITRATION BETWEEN HONG KONG AND MAINLAND CHINA
The Pre-Handover New York Convention System
Before the reunification, arbitral awards were recognized and
enforced across the border on the basis of the accession of both
China and the United Kingdom to the New York Convention. This
pre-handover cross-border arbitration system, as enforced by the
Convention, was fairly well implemented. From its inception in
1989 till its end in June 1997, approximately 150 Mainland China
awards were enforced by the High Court in Hong Kong. 11 In
accordance with the Convention, courts in Hong Kong limited their

11

Zhang, supra note 3, at 192.
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review to procedural matters. 12 In particular, during that period,
public policy challenges, known to be the most controversial but
popular ground to challenge a Convention award, were never
successful in enforcement proceedings involving Mainland China
awards.13 Before the change of sovereignty, only two applications to
enforce the CIETAC award were denied by Hong Kong courts
under public policy ground. The two successful challenges were in
Paklito Investment Ltd. v. Klockner East Asia Ltd.14 and Apex Tech
Investment Ltd. v. Chuang’s Development (China) Ltd.15
In Paklito, there was an argument between the parties of
whether steel provided by the respondent seller was defective.16 The
case was administered by CIETAC, where the tribunal notified the
parties that it would employ its own experts to inspect the steel.17
After investigation, the experts in their report found in favor of the
claimant. 18 The respondent then informed the tribunal of its
intention to comment against the report and to introduce new
evidence to rebut its conclusion.19 However, the tribunal proceeded
to render an award against the respondent without allowing it the
opportunity to provide its case on the expert report. 20 In the
enforcement proceedings, in February 1992, Master Cannon refused
to enforce the award by reason that the respondent had been
prevented from presenting its case and been denied a fair and equal
opportunity of being heard.21
The case was appealed to and heard by Judge Kaplan at the
High Court in January 1993, in which he came to the same
12

Article V(1) of the New York Convention lists a few grounds for refusal for enforcement
to be proven by the Respondent, such as (a) lack of a valid arbitration agreement; (b)
violation of due process; (c) excess of arbitral tribunal’s authority; (d) irregularity in the
composition of arbitral tribunal or arbitral procedure; and (e) the award has not yet been
binding, been set aside, or suspended. New York Convention art. V. The full text of the
New
York
Convention
is
available
at
the
UNCITRAL
website,
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/NY-conv/XXII_1_e.pdf (last visited
Dec. 5, 2013).
13
Article V(2) of the New York Convention mandates that recognition and enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards may also be refused if the enforcement authority finds the
enforcement will be against its public policy, or the dispute not arbitrable according to the
law of the place of enforcement. New York Convention art. V.
14
Paklito Inv. Ltd v. Klockner E. Asia Ltd., [1993] 2 H.K.L.R. 39, 50 (H.C.).
15
Apex Tech Inv. Ltd v. Chuang’s Dev. (China) Ltd., [1996] 2 H.K.L.R. 155, 159 (C.A.).
16
Paklito, [1993] at 2 H.K.L.R. 41.
17
Id. at 42.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id. at 40-41.
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conclusion as Master Cannon, and dismissed the appeal.22 Moreover,
Judge Kaplan made the following commentary on the cross-border
arbitration as of that time:
In the three years from 1990 to 1992, this court has
enforced approximately 40 CIETAC awards. Some of
these applications were opposed but this is the first
time that enforcement has been refused. This is a
creditable record and I would not like it thought that
problems such as occurred in this case are
commonplace in CIETAC arbitrations. Judges and
arbitrators in all jurisdictions occasionally and
unwittingly fall into error and it is in serious cases
involving arbitral awards that the enforcing court
refuses enforcement to prevent injustice. It has been
my experience that in all other cases that I have
considered from CIETAC the due process
requirements have been fairly met.23
A less noticed but important aspect of the Paklito case is its
significance to the cross-border arbitration regime. First, it is the
first case where a Mainland China arbitral award was refused
enforcement in Hong Kong. Second, it is the first time a Mainland
China arbitration authority has changed its arbitral rules in response
to a Hong Kong court review.24
One year after the judgment of Paklito, in March 1994, CIETAC
revised its arbitration rules which had been in place since 1988.
Article 40 of the 1994 CIETAC Rules, in amending Articles 26 to
28 of the 1988 Rules, provided that “a copy of the expert report
conducted by the tribunal be sent to the parties concerned who
should also be offered an opportunity to express their opinions; in
addition, the parties may require the experts to appear in the hearing
to explain their report and conclusions.”25 This timely amendment
showed that the Mainland China side was paying attention to the
Hong Kong standard of conducting arbitrations.
Apex Tech was the second case in which a Mainland China
arbitral award was refused enforcement. It was again a CIETAC
22

Id. at 40.
Id. at 50.
24
As will be further elaborated later in this article, such arbitral rule revisions constitute
the main form of convergence of the two systems of arbitration across the border.
25
Zhang, supra note 3, at 193 n.63.
23
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award. The case concerned whether a certificate issued by the
Guangdong land authority enabled the Mainland Chinese seller to
transfer his right to use the land to a Hong Kong homebuyer.26 In
the CIETAC arbitration, the tribunal conducted its own enquiries
and consulted the Guangdong Province State-owned Land Bureau
about the ambit of the certificate.27 Relying on the opinion by the
Land Bureau that the certificate had been issued for foreign
investment rather than commodity real property to be sold abroad,
and without notifying the parties of the results of its enquiries, the
tribunal made an award against the Hong Kong party.28
In the enforcement proceedings of the first instance, Judge
Leonard found that there had been a procedural irregularity, and that
the Hong Kong party was deprived of an opportunity to be heard on
the results of the tribunal’s enquiries.29 However, Judge Leonard
held that the procedural irregularity was not prejudicial as the result
could not have been different even if the opportunity to be heard
had been granted, and therefore enforced the award.30 The Hong
Kong buyer’s appeal was, however, allowed by the Court of Appeal
(the “CA”). The bench unanimously found that the name of the
certificate under the dispute was not conclusive and the Hong Kong
party had not been given an opportunity to respond to the opinion of
the Land Bureau in Guangdong.31 Although the CA did not disagree
with the finding by Judge Leonard that there had been a procedural
irregularity, the CA disagreed that had the respondent been given
due opportunity to be heard, it could not have affected the outcome
of the award and therefore allowed the appeal and refused to
enforce the award.32
Apart from illustrating its standard of review to be confined to
due process checks of arbitral award, throughout the pre-handover
years, the prevalent judicial attitude towards arbitration, particularly
cross-border arbitration with Mainland China, seemed to have been
rather pro-enforcement. In January 1993, while the cross-border
arbitration system based on the New York Convention was still in
its infant stage, Judge Kaplan, in Qinhuangdao Tongda Enterprise
26

Apex Tech, [1996] at 2 H.K.L.R. 156.
Id. at 157.
28
Id. The arbitration award in question was also made under the 1988 CIETAC Arbitration
Rules.
29
Id. at 156, 159.
30
Id. at 156.
31
Id.
32
Id. at 158-59.
27
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Development Co. and Another v. Million Basic Co. Ltd., took the
opportunity to lay out the judiciary’s pro-enforcement attitude
towards cross-border awards from Mainland China, and its disdain
towards enforcement challenges framed in terms of public policy. 33
Qinhuangdao concerned a CIETAC award in which the tribunal
held that the respondent had breached its contract. In the
enforcement proceedings at the Hong Kong Court of First Instance
(the “CFI”), the respondent argued that the contract was a forgery
and that it would be against Hong Kong’s public policy to enforce
an award based on a forged contract.34
Judge Kaplan rejected the forgery argument on the facts, but
commented in obiter that the New York Convention does not allow
parties to an international arbitration to request from the Hong Kong
courts a re-hearing on the merits of the case.35 The public policy
ground for refusal must not be seen as a catch-all provision to be
used wherever convenient. It is limited in scope and is to be
sparingly applied. Moreover, public policy requires proceedings,
both in the courts and in arbitral tribunals, to have a finite end. Once
a tribunal has set a date for the end of the proceedings, it cannot be
right that any party can go to the tribunal with new evidence and
demand that it have an opportunity to be re-heard. Judge Kaplan
referenced with approval Parsons & Whittemore v. RAKTA,36 in
which the U.S. Circuit Judge Joseph Smith famously declared, “the
Convention’s public policy defense should be construed narrowly.
Enforcement of foreign arbitral awards may be denied on this basis
only where enforcement would violate the forum state’s most basic
notions of morality and justice.”37
The narrow construction and application of the public policy
ground has been upheld in virtually all New York Convention
member states, and has ever since formed part of the basis of Hong
Kong’s pro-enforcement policy in receiving foreign arbitral awards,
in particular, awards received from Mainland China. The prudent
judicial attitude under the Convention system discouraged
challenges which sought to rely on the technical differences in
33

Qinhuangdao Tongdao Tongda Enter. Dev. Co. & Another v. Million Basic Co. Ltd.,
[1993] 1 HKLR 173, 177 (H.C.).
34
Id. at 176.
35
Id. at 177.
36
Id. at 178 (noting Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc. v. Societe Generale de
L’Industrie du Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974)).
37
Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc. v. Societe Generale De L’Industrie Du Papier
(RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969, 974 (2d Cir. 1974).
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procedural standards across the border. Unfortunately, upon the
handover, the Convention was rendered void as between Hong
Kong and Mainland China, as the two jurisdictions were within one
sovereign State, the People’s Republic of China. The situation was
only remedied two years later by the Mutual Arrangement scheme
in 1999.
The Mutual Arbitration Arrangement between Hong Kong
and Mainland China
Pursuant to the Basic Law, the mini-constitution in Hong Kong
defining Hong Kong’s overall legal relationship with the Central
Government in Beijing,38 laws previously in force in Hong Kong
were to be maintained, except those which contravened the Basic
Law, or specifically amended by the legislature. 39 Laws which
governed arbitration in Hong Kong, such as the Arbitration
Ordinance (Cap.341) and the common law on arbitration, were all
retained post-handover. As the retention of the arbitration laws was
without amendment by the legislature or the Basic Law, in theory it
would have provided a smooth transition for both domestic and
international arbitrations in Hong Kong post-handover. On the other
hand, although cross-border legal relations between Hong Kong and
Mainland China had been considered by the Sino-British Joint
Liaison Group, the possible issues with cross-border enforcement of
arbitral awards after a sovereign change seemed to have been
overlooked, as the Central Government in Beijing considered the
matter to be one of “internal politics.”40
The overlooked problem is as follows. After the handover, as
the United Kingdom was no longer the sovereign of Hong Kong, its
signature to the New York Convention could no longer cover the
newly born Hong Kong SAR. Instead, upon the handover, the
Chinese government extended her signature to the Convention
38

For a general introduction to the Basic Law and the constitutional relationship between
Hong Kong and the Central Government in mainland China, see Albert H. Y. Chen,
Constitutional Adjudication in Post-1997 Hong Kong, 15 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 627, 62782 (2006) (discussing the difficulty for the judiciary in administration of “one country, two
systems”).
39
XIANGGANG JIBEN FA art. 8 (H.K.).
40
Robert J. M. Morgan, The Transition of Sovereignty to the People’s Republic of China
and the Arbitration Regime in Hong Kong: The Issues and Their Management, MEALEY’S
INT’L ARB. REP., May 1997, at 18.
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towards Hong Kong. However, as the New York Convention only
deals with enforcement of foreign arbitral awards and Mainland
China is no longer a country foreign to Hong Kong, the Hong Kong
courts could no longer rely on the Convention to enforce Mainland
China awards, and, likewise, Mainland China courts could no longer
rely on the Convention to enforce Hong Kong awards.41
This problem was fully portrayed in Ng Fung Hong Ltd. v.
ABC.42 In that case, a CIETAC award was sought to be enforced at
the CFI in Hong Kong, pursuant to section 2GG of what was then
the Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance (Cap. 341).43 Judge Findlay
held that section 2GG only dealt with domestic arbitration.44 Since a
Mainland China arbitration award was no longer international after
the handover, it could not be a Convention award either. Section
2GG could only apply to arbitration awards where the place of
arbitration is within Hong Kong, in which case the Mainland China
awards could not fall squarely into either.45 Hence, the applicant
could only enforce the award by a separate action using the award
as evidence of an unpaid debt.46 In coming to the conclusion, Judge
Findlay rendered his decision with great reluctance:
I must say that I reach this conclusion with some
regret. The procedure for the enforcement of awards
between Hong Kong and the rest of China was
convenient and worked well. . . . [I]t is a pity that
such an award cannot be enforced directly. What is
equally important is that there may be difficulties in
seeking to enforce a Hong Kong award in Mainland
China. There seems to be no obvious reason why
there should not be a simple mechanism put in place
for the mutual enforcement of arbitral awards
between Mainland China and Hong Kong, and I
hope we will see such a system before too long.47

41

LEGAL DEPARTMENT, HONG KONG, REPORT OF THE WORKING PARTY
PROCEDURAL ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN HONG KONG AND CHINA
COMMERCIAL MATTERS (Oct. 13, 1992) (on file with author).
42
Ng Fung Hong Ltd. v. ABC, [1998] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 155 (C.F.I).
43
Id. at 156.
44
Id. at 156-57.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 156.
47
Id. at 157.
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Soon after, in Hebei Import-Export Corp. v. Polytek
Engineering Co. Ltd. (No 2), 48 the CA, in obiter, clarified the
unfortunate situation that after the handover, awards made in
Mainland China can neither be treated as New York Convention
awards nor domestic awards. This, it was held, is because a
purposive meaning has to be given to the words “domestic” in the
sentence of Article I(1) of the Convention,49 especially in light of
the principle of “one country, two systems.”50
On the Mainland China side, people’s courts were indeed
adopting the same position towards cross-border enforcement of
arbitral awards rendered in Hong Kong. In July 1998, the Taiyuan
Intermediate People’s Court in Shanxi Province indefinitely
suspended enforcement of a Hong Kong award, due to lack of a
clear legal basis.51 In about one year’s time, people’s courts in
Beijing, Anhui, Shandong and Guangdong Provinces all followed
suit in more than ten proceedings to refuse enforcement of Hong
Kong awards in the Mainland.52
The loss of the cross-border arbitration scheme with the
Mainland side negatively impacted the arbitration business in Hong
Kong, which had not only been an important legal service industry
in Hong Kong but also a supporting industry to Hong Kong’s
financial and trade services.53 Likewise, the legal lacuna seriously
harmed the cross-border economic exchanges between the two sides.
The then-Chief Justice of the Hong Kong SAR pointed out that it
48

Hebei Imp. & Exp. Corp. v. Polytek Eng’g Co. (No 2), [1998] 1 HKC 192 (C.A.).
Article I(1) of the New York Convention provides as follows: “This Convention shall
apply to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards made in the territory of the
State other than the State where the recognition and enforcement of such awards are
sought, and arising out of differences between persons, whether physical or legal. It shall
also apply to arbitral awards not considered as domestic awards in the State where their
recognition and enforcement are sought.” New York Convention art. I.
50
Hebei, [1998] at 1 H.K.C. 196-97.
51
See Robert Morgan, Mutual Enforcement of Arbitral Awards between Hong Kong and
the People’s Republic of China—One Country. Still No System, MEALEY’S INT’L ARB. REP.,
Feb. 1999, at 41 n.38.
52
Interview with Mr. Shen Deyong, Vice President of the Supreme People’s Court in
China, Wen Wei Bao, June 22, 1999, p A3.
53
Xian Chu Zhang, The Agreement between Mainland China and the Hong Kong SAR on
Mutual Enforcement of Arbitral Awards: Problems and Prospects, 29 HONG KONG L.J. 463,
465 n.19 (1999) (citing Lok Kin Wah, Alienating Itself from the International Legal
Framework; How Can Hong Kong Be a Financial Centre? XIANGGANG JINJI RIBAO (HONG
KONG ECONOMIC TIMES), Aug. 12, 1998 at A22; and Wang Shengchang, The Mutual
Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in Hong Kong SAR and the Mainland China: A Deadlock
Must Be Broken as Soon as Possible, a paper presented at the International Dispute
Resolution Conference, Hong Kong, November 1998).
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was important for the health of business and arbitration in both
Hong Kong and the rest of China that there should be an efficient
regime of mutual enforcement of arbitration awards. 54 It is
noteworthy that although Article 95 of the Basic Law explicitly
provides that the SAR may maintain judicial relations with the
judicial organs of other parts of Mainland China, and the two sides
may render assistance to each other,55 the lack of implementation
details took both sides two years to work out the Mutual
Arrangement as the new legal basis to replace the old landscape set
up by the New York Convention. It had been reported that the slow
progress in working out the cross-border arbitration scheme was
costing millions of dollars in business in Hong Kong as people were
forced to arbitrate in Singapore in order to get their arbitral awards
enforced in China.56
Against this backdrop, the conclusion of the Mutual
Arrangement on June 21, 1999 deserves applause. It brought the
long-awaited relief for many award holders and had a significant
impact on the future of cross-border arbitration. The Mutual
Arrangement declared that “the courts of the Hong Kong SAR agree
to enforce the awards made pursuant to the Arbitration Law of the
People’s Republic of China by the arbitration authorities in
Mainland China . . . and the people’s courts of Mainland China
agree to enforce the awards made in the Hong Kong SAR pursuant
to the Arbitration Ordinance of the Hong Kong SAR.”57
For eligibility requirements, the Mutual Arrangement mandates
that where a party fails to comply with an arbitral award, whether
made in Mainland China or in the Hong Kong SAR, the other party
may apply to the relevant court in the place where the party against
whom the application is filed is domiciled, or where the property to
be enforced against is situated.58 The relevant court in Hong Kong
would be the High Court, and in Mainland China the Intermediate
People’s Court.59 For parties facing the enforcement, Article 7 of
the Mutual Arrangement provides all the types of challenges
54

Zhang, supra note 52, at 466 (referring to the Keynote address made by Andrew Li, the
then-Chief Justice of the Court of Final Appeal of Hong Kong, at the International
Commercial Arbitration: Asian Update Conference, Hong Kong, Nov. 13, 1997).
55
XIANGGANG JIBEN FA art. 95 (H.K.).
56
Zhang, supra note 52, at 465-66 (citing Karen Cooper & Jane Moir, Millions ‘Lost’ as
Settlements Go to Singapore, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 30, 1998, at 3).
57
Mutual Arrangement, para. 1.
58
Mutual Arrangement, art. 1.
59
Mutual Arrangement, art. 2.
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available to them, as if they were parties to an application to enforce
a New York Convention award. This is because Article V of the
New York Convention is incorporated almost verbatim into Article
7 of the Mutual Arrangement. There is one amendment, though, on
public policy, as under the 7th paragraph of Article 7:
The enforcement of the award may be refused if the
court of Mainland China holds that the enforcement
of the arbitral award in the Mainland would be
contrary to the public interest of Mainland China, or
if the court of Hong Kong SAR decides that the
enforcement of the arbitral award in Hong Kong
would be contrary to the public policy of the Hong
Kong SAR.60
In the New York Convention, the nature of the public policy ground
is to allow enforcing courts to turn down the award if the
enforcement of that award would be contrary to the public policy of
that particular jurisdiction.61 As regards enforcement of cross-border
arbitral awards, although it is evident that the different wording
employed by Hong Kong and Mainland China constitute a ground
of refusal of a different scope, it was unclear, at the time of the
promulgation of this Mutual Arrangement, how exactly the two
grounds differ.
One may only guess that the concept of public interest is
employed for Mainland China instead of public policy because a
broader non-Convention meaning can be applied at opportune times,
so as to accommodate Mainland China’s political or economic
interests.62 In openly-publicized commentary on social and public
interest in Mainland China, the concept includes not only expressed
Chinese State commitments and social morality (which is in line
with international practice), but also unexpressed State interests and
localized short-term policies (which has no basis in international
60

Mutual Arrangement, art. 7 (emphasis added).
New York Convention, art. V.2(b).
62
For example, in Revpower Ltd. v. Shanghai Far-East Aero-Technology Imp. & Exp.
Corp., enforcement was denied on the basis of the social public interest being against the
local economic interests. Revpower Ltd. v. Shanghai Far-East Aero-Technology Imp. &
Exp. Corp. (Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, July 13, 1993),
available at http://arb.rucil.com.cn/enarticle/default.asp?id=198 (last visited Dec. 5, 2013).
See also Fredrick Brown & Catherine A. Rogers, The Role of Arbitration in Resolving
Transnational Disputes: A Survey of Trends in the People’s Republic of China, 15
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practice), 63 and “has been characterized as not only a legal
institution but also a political means to implement the [Chinese]
domestic policy.”64 In contrast, under the public policy doctrine in
Hong Kong, the Hong Kong courts have given public policy in the
Mutual Arrangement the same meaning as applied in the New York
Convention. In line with the international practice, the standard
application of the public policy defense in Hong Kong has been that
it should be construed narrowly and exercised with great caution.
Awards may only be denied where enforcement would violate the
forum’s public policy, i.e. Hong Kong’s most fundamental notion of
morality and justice.65
Despite these ongoing concerns, with the Mutual Arrangement
in place, the problem faced in the Ng Fung Hong case was finally
resolved, and the post-handover legal abyss in cross-border award
enforcement was finally filled. The problem was also resolved
retrospectively, as Article 10 of the Mutual Arrangement provided
that Mainland China awards which had been refused enforcement
during the period between July, 1 1997 and adoption of the
Arrangement (February 1, 2000), were allowed to make fresh
applications for enforcement. 66 Hence, the Mutual Arrangement
created a new cross-border arbitration scheme to replace the old
New York Convention system, which was later codified into the
Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance.67 The most recent amendment to
the Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance, taking effect in June 2011,
also confirmed the contents of this cross-border arbitration
Arrangement.68

63

Zhang, supra note 52, at 476-77.
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DEVELOPMENT OF CROSS-BORDER ARBITRATION IN HONG
KONG SINCE HANDOVER: REVIEW OF MAINLAND CHINA
ARBITRATION AWARDS BY HONG KONG COURTS
This Part consolidates all of the cases of the enforcement of
Mainland China arbitration awards by Hong Kong courts since the
handover, in an attempt to present the jurisprudence of cross-border
arbitration in Hong Kong with Mainland China and the actual
interpretation of its standard of cross-border arbitration review. It
analyzes how the courts of Hong Kong have received the new crossborder arbitration framework on the basis of the Mutual
Arrangement, how they have integrated the New York Convention
jurisprudence to the new system, and how they have shifted their
judicial attitudes towards the enforcement of Mainland China
arbitral awards over the years. It examines cross-border
enforcement of the Mainland China arbitral awards by the Hong
Kong courts from the 1997 handover till the end of 2012, covering a
period of approximately fifteen years.
The analysis focuses on enforcement issues, which remains the
area of greatest conflict and controversy within cross-border
arbitration relations, especially with the arrival of cases such as
Keeneye in 2011,69 where the two different systems and ideologies
of law and arbitration across the border fight for dominance. Before
the analysis, quantitative studies are given, to provide an overview
of the change of caseload regarding challenges to the enforcement
of Mainland China arbitration awards in Hong Kong in the past
fifteen years, underling the “one country, two systems” innovation
and Hong Kong’s change of judicial assistance attitude towards
Mainland China. After the statistical evaluation of the enforcement
landscape, this Part then moves to case jurisprudence analyses and
qualitative examination of the role-play interaction between
Mainland China arbitral regime and the Hong Kong courts, with the
judgments of the Hong Kong courts identified to serve as a catalyst
for improvements in the rules and practices of the Mainland China
arbitral authorities. Part III is also intended to pave the way for the
arguments on “positive interaction” in Part IV, which this Article
advocates as the proper and healthy development trend for crossborder arbitration and judicial assistance between the two sides.
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Keeneye II, [2012] at 1 H.K.L.R.D. 627.
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An Overview of the Caseload Change
Below are two tables compiled on basis of the data collected at
the Hong Kong International Arbitration Center (the “HKIAC”),
which show the numbers of cases received by the Hong Kong courts
where enforcement of the Mainland China awards are sought in
Hong Kong, the rate of challenges to enforcement, and the rate of
such challenges being successful. Table 2 is a breakdown
illustration of Table 1. Both Tables (Tables 1 and 2) will be
extensively referred to in the subsequent discussions in order to
examine the four different phases in which the Hong Kong courts
have treated the enforcement of the Mainland awards differently.

Table 1: Enforcement of Mainland China Awards in
Hong Kong since the Handover

Table 2: Breakdown of Table 1

2013]
Year

1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Total
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No. of
cases
where
enforce
ment
was
sought
9
0
0
30
11
7
10
3
4
6
4
0
9
6
6
6
111

No. of
cases
where
enforcem
ent was
challeng
ed
4
0
0
10
4
0
1
0
0
2
0
0
0
2
1
2
26
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Challe
nge
rate

No. of
success
ful
challen
ges

Challe
nge
success
rate

Enforceme
nt rate

44%
N/A
N/A
33%
36%
0%
10%
0%
0%
33%
0%
N/A
0%
33%
17%
33%
23%

1
0
0
2
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
5

25%
N/A
N/A
20%
25%
N/A
0%
N/A
N/A
0%
N/A
N/A
N/A
50%
0%
0%
19%

89%
N/A
N/A
93%
91%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
N/A
100%
83%
100%
100%
95%

Source: Data collected at the HKIAC70

1997-1999: The Dark Age of Cross-border Arbitration and
the Significance of the Hebei Judgment
The Dark Age of Cross-border Arbitration
As has been outlined in the previous discussion, before the
Mutual Arrangement was put into place, the Hong Kong courts
70

Data compiled by the author from data provided at the HKIAC’s website. See
Enforcement
of
Arbitration
Awards
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Hong
Kong,
HKIAC,
http://www.hkiac.org/index.php/en/hkiac-statistics/enforcement-of-awards (last visited
Dec. 5, 2013).
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generally had a hands-off attitude towards the enforcement of
Mainland China awards. 71 In the SAR courts’ first case of an
enforcement of a Mainland China arbitral award post-handover, i.e.
the Ng Fung Hong case, Judge Kaplan held that there was no legal
basis in which a Mainland China arbitral award could be enforced
by the Hong Kong courts, after the misapplication of the New York
Convention since the handover.72 Working on the basis of Article 8
of the Basic Law that the laws previously in force in Hong Kong
shall be maintained, with a bit of creative judicial interpretation, the
courts could have probably enforced a Mainland China arbitral
award as a “domestic award” under Section 2GG of the then
Arbitration Ordinance (Cap. 341).73 However, the judiciary decided
to defer the issue to the legislature. Unfortunately, the legislature
did not react quickly either. In combination with the Ng Fung Hong
case, the cross-border arbitration system entered an almost-two-year
limbo.
As is shown in Table 2, before the promulgation of the Mutual
Arrangement, for the period from 1997 to 1999, there were nine
Mainland China arbitral awards sought to be enforced in Hong
Kong in 1997, 74 but most of them were awards which were
instituted prior to the handover on July 1st in order to be decided
before the New York Convention was rendered inapplicable
between Hong Kong and China. Four of those enforcement
applications were opposed and only one opposition succeeded.75
The case where enforcement challenge was successful was
Guangdong Overseas Shenzhen Co. Ltd v. Yao Shun Group
International.76 The case concerned a CIETAC arbitration in 1996
and the award was set aside on the basis that procedural injustices
were found to have occurred. 77 The CIETAC tribunal made an
award in favor of the claimant, and enforcement was sought at the
CFI in Hong Kong.78 The respondent opposed the award under the
premise that the award was made on the same day that the arbitral
tribunal had received the respondent’s response to the claimant’s
71

See discussion supra pp. 4-7.
Ng Fung Hong Ltd., [1998] at 1 H.K.L.R.D. 156-57; see discussion supra.
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See Ng Fung Hong Ltd., [1998] at 1 H.K.L.R.D. 156; see also discussion supra.
74
See supra Table 2.
75
See supra Table 1.
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Guangdong Overseas Shenzhen Co. Ltd. v. Yao Shun Grp. Int’l, [1998] 1 H.K.C. 451
(C.F.I.).
77
Id. para. 9.
78
Id. para. 1-2.
72

2013]

CROSS-BORDER ARBITRATION IN HONG KONG WITH CHINA

63

written submissions on an issue.79 Although the tribunal seemed to
have directed that oral submissions would be received after written
submissions, an award was made without further hearing.80 The
award was then set aside by Judge Findlay under the reasoning that
the respondent’s right to be heard was infringed.81 He held that the
tribunal could not have properly considered the submissions, and if
it had intended to proceed without considering those submissions, it
should have informed the respondent.82
The Guangdong case aside, the real intrigue in this period is the
dearth of cross-border arbitration in Hong Kong. As Table 1 shows,
in the years 1998 and 1999, there were no applications to the Hong
Kong courts for the enforcement of Mainland China arbitral awards
at all.83 The reason was simply due to the disapplication of the New
York Convention as demonstrated by the Ng Fung Hong case in
1998. 84 On the other hand, despite the absence of cross-border
enforcement mechanism, it was, however, in this particular period
that Hong Kong’s leading case on arbitration law was born.
Before the Mainland China-Hong Kong Mutual Arrangement
entered into force on February 1, 2000, the basis of Hong Kong’s
stance on enforcement of arbitral awards, particularly enforcement
of the Mainland China awards, had been set up in early 1999, in the
Court of Final Appeal case, Hebei Import & Export Corp. v. Polytek
Engineering Co. Ltd.85
The Hebei Judgment
In the Hebei case, a CIETAC arbitral tribunal made an award in
favor of the claimant, Hebei, in March 1996.86 Four months later, in
July 1996, Hebei obtained ex parte leave to enforce the award at the
CFI in Hong Kong. Polytek, the respondent, then sought to resist
enforcement.87 The hearing was somewhat delayed, as the bench
determined that the hearing should be delayed pending the
determination by the supervisory court of the arbitration, i.e. the
79
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Beijing No. 2 Intermediate People’s Court, concerning an
application to set aside the award in question at the seat of
arbitration.88 The application to set aside was finally dismissed by
the Beijing Court, and the Hong Kong proceedings resumed, where
the CFI dismissed the application to set aside and allowed the
enforcement on May 15, 1997, just before the handover.89 Because
the application for enforcement was made prior to the handover, the
CIETAC award had therefore been considered a Convention award
despite the fact that it was rendered in Mainland China, which is
why this case was reported during the legal abyss period.90
The main procedural injustice in Hebei, as complained by the
respondent, was that the presiding arbitrator and expert witness
appointed by the tribunal had inspected allegedly-defective
equipment at issue in the case in the presence of the claimant’s
technicians but not the respondent’s. 91 In association, the
respondents did not receive proper notice of the inspection, were
refused a further hearing subsequent to the inspection, and were not
allowed to call the manufacturer to give evidence on the findings of
the report of the inspection.92 It was thus complained that the award
was tainted by apparent bias and violated public policy of Hong
Kong.93 Despite the fact that the supervising court in Mainland
China, the Beijing No.2 Intermediate People’s Court, refused to
entertain the respondent’s complaints, on appeal, in January 1998,
the CA ruled against the enforcement of the award on the basis of
public policy.94
The case went further to the Court of Final Appeal (the “CFA”).
On February 9, the CFA unanimously allowed the appeal and
demonstrated the pro-enforcement approach. It was found that the
opportunity of “a party to present his case and a determination by an
impartial and independent tribunal” is basic to the notions of justice
and morality in Hong Kong.95 However, in determining whether
what happened in the case was contrary to such notions, the CFA
88
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found that the respondents were able to present their case. It was
said that the inspection at the end user’s factory and the presentation
by the technicians in the absence of the respondent were procedures
which in Hong Kong might be considered unacceptable. However,
it was held that, by inaction, the respondent had waived his right to
complain about the irregularity.96
On the point of waiver, the CFA held “that refusal by a
supervisory court at the seat of arbitration [(i.e. the Beijing Court)]
to set aside an award would not debar [the party] from resisting
enforcement of the award in Hong Kong on the same ground,”97 as
“public policy reason in a supervisory court may be different from a
court of enforcement. The position would, however, be different if a
party had failed to raise [the challenge] before the supervisory court;
it would then be estopped from raising that point before the court of
enforcement.”98
The Hebei case is a leading authority. It is famous for
prescribing Hong Kong’s standard for setting aside awards based on
the public policy ground. Moreover, being the apex of Hong Kong’s
judiciary enjoying high judicial autonomy under the “one country,
two systems” principle, the CFA had, for the first time since the
handover, dealt with public policy issues concerning Mainland
China arbitration practice with detailed explanations and guidance.
As a decision made before the conclusion of the Mutual
Arrangement, the CFA placed its emphasis on adherence to the
fundamental principle of the New York Convention to encourage
the recognition and enforcement of arbitration agreements and
awards in cross-border commercial transactions. Therefore, using
public policy as a legal device to safeguard the integrity of the
justice system of the enforcing jurisdiction such as in Hong Kong
should be given a narrow construction. The “narrow construction”
was elaborated by Non-Permanent Judge Sir Anthony Mason as
such:
[T]he object of the Convention was to encourage the
recognition and enforcement of commercial
arbitration agreements in international contracts and
to unify the standards by which agreements to
arbitrate are observed and arbitral awards are
96
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enforced. In order to ensure the attainment of that
object without excessive intervention on the part of
courts of enforcement, the provisions of art V [of the
Convention], notably art V2(b) relating to public
policy, have been given a narrow construction. It has
been generally accepted that the expression ‘contrary
to the public policy of that country’ in art V2(b)
means ‘contrary to the fundamental conceptions of
morality and justice’ of the forum.99
Permanent Judge Litton stated that “courts should [also] recognize
the validity of decisions of foreign arbitral tribunals as a matter of
comity, and give effect to them, unless to do so would . . . [be
against the forum court’s] most basic notions of morality and
justice,” and that a public policy objection could only be grounded
on extreme injustice.100 Quoting Permanent Judge Bokhary on the
proper understanding of public policy:
In regard to the refusal of enforcement of awards on
public policy grounds, there are references in the
cases and texts to what has been called ‘international
public policy.’ Does this mean some standard
common to all civilized nations? Or does it mean
those elements of a State’s own public policy which
are so fundamental to its notions of justice that its
courts feel obliged to apply the same not only to
purely internal matters but even to matters with a
foreign element by which other States are affected? I
think that it should be taken to mean the latter.101
Hence, for an award to be denied it must be fundamentally offensive
to that particular jurisdiction’s notion of justice.102 Non-Permanent
Judge Sir Anthony Mason added his agreement with the opinion
that the public policy ground could only be applied to a situation
“contrary to the fundamental conceptions of morality and justice of
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Hong Kong.”103 In this regard all the justices firmly took the same
stand on the application criterion of public policy in Hong Kong.104
The Hebei judgment shows that the Hong Kong courts are
predisposed towards enforcement of arbitration awards. The courts
are also willing to overlook small amounts of inequity as long as the
injustice caused is curable, severable, or is not so fundamentally
offensive as to shock Hong Kong’s most basic notions of justice.
The Hebei standard, as we see in cases from subsequent years, has
made challenges under public policy grounds difficult and deterred
challenges on pure technical grounds.
In the meantime, the Hebei judgment had been made entirely in
accordance with the New York Convention. Because the Mutual
Arrangement has largely followed the contents of the Convention,
courts in Hong Kong have been able to employ Convention
jurisprudence, in particular the Hebei ratio, in the post-MutualArrangement cross-border arbitration system and in almost all
subsequent arbitration enforcement proceedings in Hong Kong.105
As will be demonstrated by following discussions, it is generally
believed that the pro-enforcement approach laid down by Hebei was
well suited to face the new political reality of reunification.
2000-2001: The Case Rebound by Riding the Wave of Hebei
With the Mutual Arrangement taking effect on February 1, 2000,
the cross-border arbitration activities between the two sides were
revived. In accordance with Article 10 of the Arrangement, which
was later incorporated into Section 40G of the then-Hong Kong
Arbitration Ordinance (Cap.341), Mainland China arbitration
awards which had been refused enforcement during the period of
legal abyss (i.e. between July 1, 1997 and February 1, 2000) were
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allowed to make fresh applications for enforcement.106 As such,
2000 was the year in which the biggest portion of applications to
enforce Mainland China awards was made in history, with a total of
30 applications being made that year.107 In the next year, 2001, 11
applications to enforce Mainland China awards were made, which,
although much less than the previous year, is the second-highest
total in application volume over the one-and-a-half decades since
the handover.108
Not only was the enforcement application volume the largest
ever in these two years, the volume of cases where enforcement was
opposed, as of the year end of 2012, was also the greatest, with 10
enforcement applications being challenged in 2000 and another 4
challenges in 2001.109 Since then, there have never been more than
two cases in any single year in which applications to enforce
Mainland China arbitral awards were opposed.110 It is interesting to
note, however, that although the opposition rate was high in the
years after the Mutual Arrangement was promulgated, the success
rate of those challenges was quite low; hence, the enforcement rate
of Mainland China awards in Hong Kong remained as high as above
90%.111 This is because the pro-enforcement attitude of Hong Kong
courts towards Convention awards, as espoused in Hebei, had been
equally applied towards the enforcement of Mainland China arbitral
awards, as we will see in a chain of cases which were adjudicated
shortly after Mainland China awards became enforceable in Hong
Kong under the bilateral agreement.
One of the very first cases where a Mainland China award was
sought to be enforced in Hong Kong under the Mutual Arrangement
was Shanghai City Foundation Works Corp. v. Sunlink Ltd. 112 The
Shanghai case concerned an arbitration award made by CIETAC in
October 1999, but, due to the lack of a cross-border enforcement
scheme, the CIETAC award was unable to be enforced in Hong
Kong until after February 2000. 113 In the case, the respondent
alleged that enforcement of the award should be refused, as there
106
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was an oral agreement between the parties providing that whatever
the outcome of the arbitration, the settlement of the outstanding
sums would only be payable after certain other conditions were
fulfilled.114 The court refused to withhold enforcement of the award
to allow oral testimony as to the existence of the alleged
agreement.115 Applying Hebei, it was held that the respondent’s
failure to raise its challenge at the supervisory court in Mainland
China amounted to an estoppel or a defeat of bona fide such as to
justify enforcement of the award.116
Although the respondent referred the court to the case of J.J.
Agro (P) Industries Ltd. v. Texuna International Ltd., in which case
Judge Kaplan, in 1992, decided to hear oral testimony in relation to
an allegation of fraud, it was held that the fact that the case was the
only authority the respondent referred to indicated that acceding to
an application to hear oral evidence is the exception rather than the
rule. 117 The court found that such matters of legal validity were
matters best left to the supervisory court, i.e. court in Mainland
China, unless the challenge to enforcement involved matters which
would invoke Hong Kong’s public policy.118 However, although
public policy was also pleaded to challenge the award enforcement,
applying Hebei, the high threshold of Hong Kong’s most basic
notions of morality and justice had not been met.119
Another noteworthy case in this period was Shantou Zheng Ping
Xu Yueli Shu Kuao Trading Co. Ltd. v. Wesco Polymers Ltd.120 The
case concerned a CIETAC award in 2001 over a contract for the
supply of goods. 121 The dispute was straightforward. What was
noteworthy was a comment made by Judge Burrell in the case, on
the clear application of the Convention jurisprudence to the
enforcement of Mainland China arbitral awards following the
enactment of the cross-border Mutual Arrangement:
In my judgment, no extra burden lies on the plaintiff
which makes his task more difficult than it would
otherwise have been [if it was a Convention award].
114
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The Plaintiff starts therefore with the advantage of the
strong pro-enforcement bias afforded by the
legislation.122
This shows and reinforces Hong Kong courts’ pro-enforcement
attitude towards Mainland China arbitral awards, and the courts’
unwillingness to differentiate between the thresholds of challenges
to enforcement applications of Mainland China awards and
Convention awards. It is generally believed that this proenforcement approach, as laid down by Hebei, has been well taken
to properly redefine the cross-border arbitration relationship
between Hong Kong and Mainland China after the reunification.

2002-2009: The Calm under the Pro-Enforcement Policy
In the period from 2002 to 2009, courts in Hong Kong kept
riding the wave of Hebei in virtually all enforcement challenges,
particularly those challenges against Mainland China arbitral
awards. The judiciary had formed a clear and express proenforcement attitude. Based on the figures in Table 2, it can be seen
that there were 43 Mainland China awards seeking enforcement in
Hong Kong in the years 2002 till 2009, but only 3 cases had met
with challenges and none of these challenges had been successful,
making the enforcement rate reach the historic high of 100% for
eight years. 123 This is a stunning reversal in attitude by parties
facing unfavorable Mainland China arbitral awards, as compared to
the two previous years, during which 41 enforcement applications
were made and 14 were challenged before the Hong Kong courts.124
Despite the calm and light caseload (on challenges) from 2002 till
2009, a couple of high quality judgments were delivered which
clarified the proper role of Hong Kong courts in cross-border
enforcement actions, particularly on the point of public policy.
One of the challenges concerned a CFA decision on public
policy. In 2007, in Unruh v. Seeberger, “it was alleged that a
Mainland China arbitral award should not be enforced because it
122
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was made in circumstances involving a champertous agreement,
which was illegal in Hong Kong.”125 In balancing public policies
between the supervisory jurisdiction (Mainland China) and
enforcement jurisdiction (Hong Kong), it was held that it was
improper for the Hong Kong courts to impose its public policy
against champerty on mature commercial parties who have chosen
to arbitrate in a jurisdiction where champerty is not contrary to
public policy (i.e. Mainland China).126
Another high-profile case against Mainland China arbitral award
enforcement was made in 2008 in Xiamen Xinjingdi Group Ltd. v.
Eton Properties Ltd. & Anor where the role of the Hong Kong
courts in enforcement actions was properly explained. 127 The
Xiamen case concerned a disputed termination by the Hong Kong
respondents of a contract, which allowed the Mainland Chinese
claimant to develop and receive profit from a piece of land of a
holding company owned by the respondent. 128 Arbitration
proceedings commenced before CIETAC in August 2005.129 The
respondent defended its case by stating that the agreement was
contrary to Mainland Chinese law and thus unenforceable, and that
performance was impossible as the respondent had begun
construction work on the land.130 The respondent then applied to set
aside leave to enforce the arbitral award, claiming that to enforce it
would be against public policy, as it was fundamentally offensive to
the court’s notion of justice to order it to perform the award when
the applicant was not ready, willing or able to perform its
obligations under the agreement.131 The case eventually reached the
CA.132 However, it was at the CFI and through Judge Reyes that
much analysis was given on the standard of arbitration review and
enforcement policy in Hong Kong, and such analysis was agreed to
in the CA.133
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According to Judge Reyes, an enforcement court only has two
tasks to make a decision.134 First, it has to determine whether an
award is valid.135 Second, it has to determine whether there exists a
valid ground to refuse the award’s enforcement.136 If the award is
valid and there exists no valid ground to refuse enforcement, the
award should be mechanistically enforced.137 The enforcement court
needs not bother itself with the reasoning or circumstances in which
the award was made.138 Hence, the court’s role should be “although
by no means entirely ‘mechanistic’, ‘as mechanistic as possible’.”139
Consistent with the “mechanistic” principle, Judge Reyes held
that unless an award was plainly “incapable of performance, such
that it would be obviously oppressive to order a party to comply
with it”, the court could not hold that to enforce the award would be
contrary to public policy.140 If it was merely arguable that the award
was incapable of performance, it is incumbent on the parties that the
issue be raised at the courts of supervision;141 it was held that it is
not the place of enforcement courts “to go behind the award,” nor to
“explore the reasoning,” and allow the re-opening of what the
arbitrators had already decided.142 If the issue was not raised at the
courts of supervision, it was not for the courts of enforcement to
second-guess how the courts of supervision might have decided.
The Hong Kong judgment and the “mechanic” principle had quoted
an earlier English Court of Appeal judgment, C v D.143 The English
Court held that:
[A]n agreement as to the seat of arbitration is
analogous to an exclusive jurisdiction clause. Any
claim for a remedy going to the . . . validity of an
existing interim or final award is agreed to be made
only in the courts of the place designated as to the
seat of the arbitration.144
134
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It seems that the Hong Kong position on enforcement and
public policy towards Mainland China arbitral awards, up to the
Xiamen case, has been consistently in a cautious manner.145 The
court generally follows the narrow interpretation of public policy,
although in the meantime parties are reminded of the importance of
raising procedural objections at the supervisory court in a timeous
manner.146
As the line of the above cases shows, the Hong Kong courts
respect the fact that when parties agree to arbitration, it is their
intention that their dispute be settled and argued by arbitration and
not in court. Hence, any error in judgment by arbitration would be
insufficient to counterbalance the public policy of pro-enforcement,
unless there is some substantial injustice to render the enforcement
repugnant.147
For reasons of comity between the two jurisdictions and the
unreasonableness of requiring Mainland China arbitrations to
adhere to the strict standards of Hong Kong law, Hong Kong courts
have closely scrutinized all claims challenging enforcement.148 The
courts have placed a high threshold of public policy by requiring the
alleged infringement to be fundamentally contrary to Hong Kong’s
most basic sense of justice and morality.149 “[T]he high threshold
set by Hong Kong courts may have acted as a potent disincentive
against frivolous claims on public policy, and to protect the
operation of the arbitration systems, both in Hong Kong and with
Mainland China.” 150 However, the test has been controversial
because parties with genuine issues of public policy and who are
subject to irregular awards, now find it “difficult to avail themselves
of the public policy exception to enforcement.”151
A most recent Hong Kong decision considers public policybased procedural objections to the “enforcement of a Mainland
China arbitral award that was made following the hybrid process of
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mediation and arbitration (the ‘med-arb’).”152 The “Keeneye case,”
(Gao Haiyan v Keeneye Holdings Ltd.), decided by the CA in early
December 2011, in which the appeal against the ruling of the CFI
was allowed, 153 represents the latest judicial approach of
enforcement of Mainland China awards in Hong Kong.154 As will
be demonstrated in following discussions, the Keeneye case throws
the judicial standard in enforcement proceedings, particularly with
respect to the enforcement of a Mainland China award in Hong
Kong, into confusion.

2010 and onwards: The Controversy and Discontent since
Keeneye
The Keeneye Case
In the period covering 2010 to 2012, as reflected in Table 2,
although there were altogether five enforcement challenges against
Mainland China awards, only one challenge was successful. On the
other hand, it is in this period, after almost ten years of calm in the
cross-border arbitration regime, that the future uncertainty of
whether the high standard of Hong Kong courts in cross-border
enforcement actions should be lowered to defer to the Mainland
China arbitration status quo and its developing rule-of-law reality
has been unveiled. What is striking in this period is a single case,
the Keeneye, in which the disparity between the rulings of the CFI
and CA seemed to make the public policy approach not as clear cut
as before (or more nuanced now) when the Mainland China
arbitration practice holds a standard of integrity which is lower than
that required in Hong Kong.155
On April 12, 2011, Judge Reyes at the CFI denied enforcement
of a Mainland China arbitral award by reason that it infringed Hong
Kong’s public policy, because it was made under circumstances
152
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indicating apparent bias.156 The reasoning of the case is secondary
to how the arbitration was conducted. In the dispute settlement,
mediation was conducted as part of the arbitration process, i.e. medarb.157 “The bias was found to arise from a private meeting between
an arbitrator nominated by the applicants and the Secretary General
of the Xi’an Arbitration Commission (the “XAC”) and an affiliate
of the respondents, who was told to ‘work on’ [(做工作)] a RMB
250 million proposal” at a dinner table in a hotel with the
respondents in the med-arb process.158 “The respondents eventually
refused to pay the proposed settlement and proceeded to
arbitration.”159 The tribunal ruled against the respondent, but the
award amounted to only RMB 50 million.160
The Arbitration Rules of the XAC expressly provided for
mediation to take place within the arbitration process (i.e. med-arb).
Pursuant to Article 37 of the Rules, med-arb should be conducted
“by the arbitral tribunal or the presiding arbitrator,” though it goes
on to say that “[w]ith the approval of the parties, any third party
may be invited to assist the mediation, or they may act as mediator.”
161
After the award was rendered, the respondents challenged the
award to the supervisory court, the Xi’an Intermediate Court, on
ground of bias and breaches of the proper procedure of med-arb
under the XAC Rules.162
The Xi’an court found against the claims, ruling that there was
no evidence of bias, no breach of the arbitral rules, and upheld the
award. 163 The respondents then resisted the award at the
enforcement stage in Hong Kong.164
As the presiding judge at the CFI trial, Judge Reyes refused to
follow the decision of the Xi’an Court. The CFI held that although
the Xi’an Court, by its standards, found the private meeting with
“working on” parties to be entirely fine and the subsequent award
perfectly valid, in accordance with Hebei, the Hong Kong courts
156
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could apply their own standards when deciding whether an award
should be refused under public policy grounds. 165 The CFI held that
a med-arb process may run into self-evident difficulties [with
respect to] impartiality and the risk of apparent bias arising from an
arbitrator also acting as mediator.166 Moreover, the phrase “work
on” insinuated that the party might have been actively pushed to
accept the settlement proposal.167 As such, it was held that when the
circumstances surrounding an arbitrator would cause a fair-minded
observer to apprehend a real risk of bias, an award made in that
situation could be refused enforcement under the public policy
exception of Hong Kong.168 The CFI thus concluded that the medarb conducted, while insufficient to prove actual bias, when
combined with the contrasting result of the RMB 50 million and the
proposed RMB 250 million settlement during mediation, can lead a
reasonable bystander to apprehend bias as a real possibility in the
making of the award.169
However, upon appeal, Vice President Tang (“Tang VP”),
Justice of Appeal Fok and Justice Sakhrani at the CA unanimously
allowed the appeal and reinstated the award.170
At the CA trial, in leading the bench, Tang VP stressed and
reapplied the usual strict policy of disallowing the refusal of
enforcement of arbitral awards except in most exceptional
circumstances threatening Hong Kong’s morality and justice.171 The
CA agreed with the CFI that Hong Kong can apply its own public
policy in deciding whether outside arbitral awards are to be denied
enforcement in Hong Kong. The CA was, however, concerned that
deference should be paid to supervisory court in Mainland China
and to the fact that the Mainland supervisory court had previously
found that there was no finding of bias and that the med-arb process
was properly proceeded with according to their standards. Hence,
the CA blamed the CFI for not having placed enough weight on the
decision of the Xi’an Court.172 After considering all the facts of the
case, the CA held that a Mainland China court would be in a better
position to decide on the properness of the procedure where the
165
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court saw no bias and no complaint about the venue had been made
to the Xi’an Court.173 Thus guided, in deference to the supervisory
court, the CA reversed the CFI’s ruling, concluding that apparent
bias had not been sufficiently proven to warrant a refusal to enforce
the Mainland China award.174
While the CA came to this conclusion on basis of the common
principles of finality of arbitration and comity of cross-border
arbitration, and most directly, the English authority of Minmetals
Germany GmbH v Ferco Steel Ltd.,175 its application is somewhat
controversial. The CA decision was questioned on whether it has
lowered its standards too far in the court’s usual policy of refusing
to enforce biased awards, in order to protect the vibrancy of the
cross-border arbitration system.176
The Controversies
The Keeneye case has fleshed out a new wave of discussions on
public policy that the Hong Kong common law mindset has had
against the Mainland China style arbitration. 177 The first
controversy is on the issue of bias and its associated due process
concerns, and the second is on whose standard of bias should be
employed when deciding whether the public policy of Hong Kong
was infringed by the purported bias. Viewing the two controversies
together, it seems that, since Keeneye, Hong Kong courts have lost
clarity in their enforcement standard and the cross-border arbitration
order has been driven towards Mainland China standards.
Regarding the first controversy, the problem of bias in the medarb context is latent. In cases where the roles of mediator and
arbitrator are assumed by the same person, when mediation fails and
parties proceed to arbitration, the mediator-turned-arbitrator may
become privy to confidential information not placed before the
173
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arbitral tribunal but only available during mediation, and hence
loses his impartiality.178 The Keeneye case highlights the difficulties
inherent in med-arb proceedings, particularly with respect to the
mode of mediation. This is crucial in the Mainland China context,
as mediation is a much relied on dispute resolution system and
parties are highly encouraged to adopt mediation within arbitration.
Moreover, the mediator-turned-arbitrator may become “attached
to any settlement proposals he may have made” and would try to
“prove himself right during the arbitration.”179 It is the combination
of these factors which makes it easy for an arbitrator to lose his
impartiality after having assumed the role of mediator. To counter
this possibility, many “common law arbitrators therefore tend to
refuse to participate in med-arb, so that they can avoid appearing to
be biased, even if they [might be] confident that they can act
professionally and adjudicate without bias.”180 It is this trend that
“was the main thrust of the challenge of the award in the Keeneye
case.”181
At the CFI, Judge Reyes held that if an award were found to be
tainted by the appearance of bias, the enforcement “would be an
affront to this Court’s sense of justice”182 and hence, an award made
in that situation could be refused enforcement under the public
policy exception of Hong Kong. 183 The point on bias was further
investigated in the CA, which “found the Hebei case to be the
definitive authority.”184 On the standard of apparent bias, Permanent
Judge Bokhary found:
[S]hort of actual bias, I do not think that the Hong
Kong courts would be justified in refusing
enforcement of a Convention award on public policy
grounds as soon as appearances fall short of what we
insist upon in regard to impartiality where domestic
cases or arbitrations are concerned. . . . After all,
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where the appearance of bias is strong enough, it can
lead to an inference that actual bias existed.185
“From this quote, it seems that only the finding of actual bias would
be sufficient to raise the public policy ground to resist the
enforcement” in Hong Kong.186 In Hebei, however, Non-Permanent
Judge Sir Anthony Mason at page 139 said: “[T]he opportunity of a
party to present his case and a determination by an impartial and
independent tribunal which is not influenced, or seen to be
influenced, by private communications are basic to the notions of
justice and morality in Hong Kong.”187
It seems that Non-Permanent Judge Sir Anthony Mason,
espousing a standard different from Permanent Judge Bokhary’s
threshold, was saying that “apparent bias could also be a ground
under public policy to refuse enforcement.” 188 Despite the
seemingly contrary views, Tang VP at the CA, in his leading
judgment in Keeneye, did not find any conflict between the two
quotes.189 Unfortunately, Tang VP has not confirmed whether an
appearance of bias strong enough that actual bias can be inferred is
sufficient to pass the court’s current threshold of the basic notion of
justice in Hong Kong. It is still unknown to what extent the apparent
bias can be justified in order to deny the enforcement of an award.
The standard is controversial in enforcement challenges when
awards are made in circumstances involving some sort of apparent
bias which is not uncommon in Mainland China as a developing
rule-of-law jurisdiction with less respect for due process.
The associated problem with bias is the likely violation of due
process. “[A] violation of due process may occur, as the additional
information obtained in the private caucus of mediation may affect
the mediator-turned-arbitrator’s mind without the other party having
the right to question the validity and accuracy of what was said in
the caucus.”190 Fairly speaking, it is not that when an arbitrator acts
as a mediator, he is already under suspicions of bias and impartiality,
but it is reasonable to say that arbitrators acting as mediators are
185

Keeneye II, [2012] at 1 H.K.L.R.D. 660-61 (quoting Hebei, [1999] at 2 H.K.C.F.A.R.
124).
186
Gu & Zhang, supra note 124, at 1020.
187
Hebei, [1999] at 2. H.K.C.F.A.R. 139.
188
Gu & Zhang, supra note 124, at 1020.
189
Keeneye II, [2012] at 1 H.K.L.R.D. 661.
190
Gu & Zhang, supra note 124, at 1021 (citing De Vera, supra note 172).

80

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA EAST ASIA LAW REVIEW Vol. 9

under conditions where it is easy to develop a due process concern.
Internationally, the problem is often resolved by requiring the
arbitrator who participated in the mediation to disclose all
information which may be relevant to the issues. For example, in
Hong Kong, the Arbitration Ordinance requires arbitrators to
disclose to all other parties all such confidential information
received by him in the role as a mediator if he considers the
information material to the arbitral proceedings.191
Conversely, the situation is far from satisfactory in Mainland
China. The 1994 China Arbitration Law (the “AL”) “only provides
sweep reference to the practice of med-arb[s].”192 The AL contains
neither “provisions disallowing private meetings (caucus), nor are
there any provisions requiring arbitrators to disclose information
obtained from such meetings to other parties or to the rest of the
tribunal.” 193 The AL is further silent on whether Chinese
“arbitrators are restricted from using their knowledge of such
information when deciding the case afterwards” and it is not
uncommon that mediator-turned-arbitrators would rely on the
confidential information in making the award. 194 “Hence, the
difference in legislative policy the two jurisdictions have towards
the maintenance of due process is outstanding [when Mainland
China] awards are transferred to Hong Kong seeking
enforcement.”195
The second controversy is even more problematic, as the CA
removed the clarity on whose standard of apparent bias was to be
employed when deciding whether the public policy of Hong Kong
was infringed by the purported bias. The default position used to be
clearly the standard of the enforcing jurisdiction, i.e. Hong Kong’s
standard. Quoting Sir Anthony Mason in the Hebei case, “[i]t has
been generally accepted that the expression ‘contrary to the public
policy of that country’ in art.V2(b) [of the New York Convention]
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means ‘contrary to the fundamental conceptions of morality and
justice’ of the forum.”196
Following principles established in Hebei, a party which
unsuccessfully challenges an arbitral award before the supervisory
court will not be precluded from raising the same ground before the
enforcement court because the public policy of the latter may well
differ from that of the former.197 The CA, however, was concerned
that the refusal of a supervisory court to revoke an award on the
ground of apparent bias needs to be respected as such refusal was
relevant to the enforcement court’s decision.198
Thus guided, the CA chastised the CFI for not having placed
enough weight on the decision of the supervisory court (Xi’an court)
on the issue of apparent bias. 199 At the CA, Tang VP considered
that the enforcement court must take into account the difference in
mediation culture and med-arb practice between Hong Kong and
Mainland China. Hence, the Mainland China court is better able to
decide whether mediation by way of a dinner meeting in a hotel
would be acceptable in Mainland China practices, where the court
saw no bias.200 The Mainland court decision was therefore followed
in Hong Kong because of this deference.
Keeneye is a surprising decision, as it throws into doubt the
seemingly-established law that when an enforcement court
considers award challenges under the auspices of public policy, it is
only the public policy of the forum court which is relevant.
Although the Hong Kong courts’ application of Hong Kong’s public
policy is tempered with competing concerns such as adopting
Mainland China’s views as the supervisory court, that does not
translate into deference towards its decision without balancing in
the first place. Hong Kong courts should be slow in deferring to the
opinion of the supervisory courts after properly balancing the proenforcement policies against Hong Kong’s public policy of
requiring arbitrations to be free from bias and conform to the
principles of due process.201 Otherwise, the public policy exception
of allowing enforcement courts to refuse awards according to their
196
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fora’s own standards would be emasculated. In this regard, the CA
has been criticized for having too readily deferred its opinion of the
enforceability of an award to the Mainland China supervisory court
without full consideration and careful balancing of the relevant
issues of the Hong Kong policy of justice and morality against the
policy of pro-enforcement of the Mainland China award.202
Implication of the Keeneye in Cross-border Arbitral
Relations
In retrospect, the Keeneye case may be considered a skillful
“maneuver” of being considerate to Mainland China arbitration
system and legal institutions. The CA judgment was not crystal
clear in its reasoning and is ambiguous enough to sustain different
interpretations of the decision. As to what has been reflected in
Keeneye, Tang VP at the CA, asked the panel to pay due regard to
how mediation was normally conducted in the arbitral seat and to
how the supervisory court would be in a better position to assess the
norms of arbitration practice (i.e. whether mediation by way of a
dinner meeting in a hotel with “work on” by other parties would be
acceptable in Mainland China).203 The CA judgment, after all, never
attempted to substitute its views for the Mainland China court’s
interpretation on the properness of its arbitral procedure. The legal
community in Mainland China seemed satisfied with this approach,
the legal community in Hong Kong has, however, challenged the
decision as deviating from Hong Kong’s former approach and
standard. It was argued that the CA judgment gave too much
deference to Mainland China’s arbitral practice. It was also
commented that such recognition, or understanding, would foster
cross-border arbitral and business relations. 204 As the reasoning
behind this approach was not fully explained in the judgment, both
Mainland China and Hong Kong’s legal communities may read
from the judgment what they desire. The jurisprudence problems at
issue, however, are more complicated than merely whether Hong
Kong courts recognize Mainland China arbitral practice or
convergence between the two jurisdictions per se; such recognition
involves legal repercussions which could determine the future
202
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interaction trend and development path of the two arbitral systems
across the border.
First, the Keeneye case reveals a disagreement between Hong
Kong courts concerning the relative weight they should place on the
pro-enforcement policies of comity and finality and whether the
court should defer its opinion on the enforceability of an award
when the supervisory court’s public policy is substantially different
from what the Hong Kong courts apply. As has been analyzed, this
disagreement is undesirable and makes it difficult for parties to
anticipate the outcome of enforcement challenges made under the
public policy ground in Hong Kong.
Second, there is the more subtle legal conflict between the two
jurisdictions. The conflict has long been known to both sides, as
Hong Kong and Mainland China have had different legal histories
and have been driven by different sets of legal systems and
ideologies. Even after unification for more than fifteen years, the
legal, cultural, and ideological disparities between the two sides as
reflected in Keeneye are still outstanding. The common expression
of “work on” and the practice to involve third parties for influence
in the Mainland Chinese arbitral process played a delicate role in
the Keeneye case and led to different judgments in Mainland China
and Hong Kong, as well as different rulings at the two levels of
Hong Kong courts in Hong Kong. Judge Reyes at the CFI found
apparent bias with the apprehension of “a fair minded observer” (in
Hong Kong)205 whereas Tang VP at the CA based his judgment
more on “an understanding of how mediation is normally conducted
in the place where it was conducted” (in Mainland China).206 This
shows that the different expectations of arbitral standards across the
border can cause both legal and ideological conflicts, and as these
differences persist, so will their corollary conflicts. In the particular
scenario of med-arb, problems will arise more frequently with
respect to Mainland China arbitration than with arbitrations from
other New York Convention jurisdictions, as not only is the practice
more popular in Mainland China arbitration, but there are less
procedural safeguards accorded to parties in Mainland China as well.
Hence, the impact of the Keeneye case on cross-border arbitration
cannot be underestimated.

205
206

Keeneye I, [2011] at 3 H.K.C. 157, para 53.
Keeneye II, [2012] at 1 H.K.L.R.D. 659.
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The Keeneye case also seems to indicate that the standard of
public policy in the cross-border enforcement of arbitral awards in
Hong Kong might be somewhat China-oriented, or comparatively
more relaxed than what is applied to the New York Convention
awards.207 Pursuant to the reasoning of the CA in Keeneye, because
both parties involved in the arbitration come from Mainland China
and the Mainland Chinese court has interpreted the legality of the
case, it would thus be undesirable for Hong Kong courts to read into
the mind of the Mainland China judges unless the issues threaten
the fundamental justice and morality of Hong Kong.208 What is
worth noting is that the legal issues such as bias, private caucus,
confidentiality, and due process concerned in med-arb procedures,
although challenged as problems in Hong Kong, have, however,
been practiced for ages and never been considered as problems in
[the] Mainland China dispute resolution context.209 As Mainland
China lags behind in comparison to the common law’s respect of
the rule of law and due process, similar disagreements over
Mainland China’s arbitral practices are likely to arise. Hence, if
Hong Kong’s public policy standards are applied rigidly, Hong
Kong courts may find themselves facing all sorts of enforcement
challenges of procedural violations and impartiality issues involving
Mainland China awards.
Such conflicts over arbitral standards are not particular to
Keeneye, and can be found in many earlier cases, such as in Hebei
(where the Mainland China arbitral authorities were found to have
less respect for the importance of due process), and in Unruh v.
Seeberger (where Mainland China had no qualms about
champertous agreements). Regardless of legal terms and technical
grounds, the real concern behind all of the worries seem to be the
quality and integrity of Mainland China arbitral awards, especially
when the awards are made by government-affiliated local arbitration
commissions widespread throughout the nation after the taking
effect of the AL in 1995.210 Hence, the Keeneye jurisprudence and
the conflicts it involves reflect the difficulties, or delicate discontent,
of Hong Kong courts in finding the appropriate balance between
being pro-enforcement and respecting due process with respect to
207
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Mainland-China-standard arbitration, even after one and a half
decades of practice of cross-border arbitration.
Summary: The Jurisprudence of Cross-border Arbitration in
Hong Kong with Mainland China
To conclude this Part, with a view to the Tables on caseload
change regarding the enforcement of Mainland China arbitral
awards in Hong Kong, it can be seen that the Hong Kong courts
have faithfully followed the pre-handover pro-enforcement policy
and have heavily relied on New York Convention jurisprudence.
Past the first two years after the promulgation of the Mutual
Arrangement, the pro-enforcement policy as upheld by the Hebei
case has kept award challenges to the rate as low as 10%.211 The
success rate of challenges has similarly been quite low, at an
average of 21% since the handover.212 With an overall enforcement
rate as high as 95%, the good health of the cross-border arbitration
enforcement system in Hong Kong with respect to Mainland China
is evident.213
Turning from statistics to legal development, the
abovementioned cases represent the jurisprudence evolving thus far
as to how Hong Kong courts have treated Mainland China awards
and how they have defined their role in the cross-border arbitral
order with respect to Mainland China. In summary, since the 1997
handover, the jurisprudence has generally undergone four different
phases, in which the Hong Kong courts have treated the
enforcement of Mainland China arbitral awards with different
attitudes.
First, there was an enforcement dark age in the initial years of
handover due to the legal vacuum regarding the cross-border
arbitration scheme (1997-1999). It was followed by a significant
rebound of cases after the promulgation of the Mutual Arrangement
(2000-2001). The cross-border enforcement in Hong Kong kept
calm and rode swift upon the wave of Hebei for a significant period
of time (2002-2009). Finally, in the most recent years, there has
been controversy and discontent over the “China-centric”
211
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enforcement standard since the publication of the Keeneye case
(2010 and onwards). Some of these changes were due to
circumstantial situations which bound the court, while others could
be reflective of a conflicting judicial attitude juggling a desire to
uphold Hong Kong’s high standard of arbitration (including its high
standard of public policy, due process, and rule-of-law) and to
accommodate the more relaxed standard of Mainland China
arbitration practice to be pro-enforcement.
Faced with the new challenge following the constitutional idea
of “one country, two systems” and in the absence of a cross-border
arbitration scheme between the two sides, it is noted that Hong
Kong courts have not attempted to resist or limit the authority of
Mainland China arbitral awards in the initial years following the
handover. Instead, they have extended the New York Convention
jurisprudence of being pro-enforcement towards Mainland Chinese
awards (which used to be categorized as “foreign” before the
handover). In the meantime, as shown in Hebei, they adhered to the
common law approach of public policy and due process and
managed to guide Mainland China in its development of an
international-standardized arbitration system, by encouraging its
reform and improvement.214 Hence, in the first dozen years after the
handover (1997 to 2009), courts in Hong Kong seem to have
handled well the dual challenges of finding her place in the new
cross-border arbitration order by setting up a high standard of
arbitration review in interaction with Mainland China and leading
the new-born SAR forward in becoming a regional and international
arbitration center. This ability to handle the dual challenges has
been degraded, however, with the arrival of Keeneye, as the legal
and ideological conflicts in the undercurrent between Hong Kong
and Mainland China have been uncovered.
Delving into the Keeneye jurisprudence, it seems that when
reviewing Mainland China awards seeking enforcement in Hong
Kong and in assessing Hong Kong’s public policy, the current
approach is that the Hong Kong court is entitled to consider the
question of bias from its own view point. But due regard should be
given to the views of the Mainland China court as the supervisory
court of arbitration. In the absence of a decision by the Mainland
214
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China court, the Hong Kong courts have full autonomy to interpret
the public policy on their own and to decide the standard of
enforcement in accordance with their own interpretation. Once the
Mainland China court has spoken, however, the Hong Kong courts
will comply. In the meantime, there is an equally important issue of
estoppel. According to Hebei, the losing party, before coming to the
enforcement court (i.e. the Hong Kong court), has to challenge first
before the supervisory court (i.e. the Mainland China court);
otherwise, the right to challenge would be considered waived and
the party would be estopped from raising the challenge before the
enforcement court. 215 Hence, whatever the Mainland China
supervisory court is going to say about its arbitral procedure, the
Hong Kong courts will be bound by it. Then what is the role of the
enforcement court? The most recent jurisprudence has transmitted a
clear message that the enforcement consideration, in particular, the
public policy of Hong Kong, would be leaning towards, and may
even be “subject to,” the perspective of Mainland China. Hong
Kong is thus losing the autonomy to define its own public policy.
Although the pro-China-enforcement policy might be appealing to
the cross-border business community, particularly against the
backdrop of the closer economic cooperation between the two sides,
216
is the “China-centric” standard an appropriate approach?
Moreover, is it a healthy interaction or phenomenon in terms of
cross-border arbitration development?
As previously analyzed, the Keeneye judgment underlies the
controversy of how far Hong Kong courts should take into account
and accommodate, if not lean towards, the decisions of the
Mainland China courts in cross-border arbitration context. It was
clear in Keeneye, as the disagreements of the two levels of the Hong
Kong courts show, that there are reasonable concerns among the
Hong Kong judiciary towards the fledging level of rule-of-law and
informal dispute resolution culture in Mainland China. The CA
judgment was thus challenged as too quick a deference to the
Mainland China judicial decisions. Additionally, the Keeneye
judgment was challenged for not having properly and carefully
balanced Hong Kong’s policy of pro-enforcement against its high
215
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standard of due process and, accordingly, Hong Kong may have lost
its identity in the cross-border arbitral order.217
THE POSITIVE INTERACTION OF THE CROSS-BORDER
ARBITRATION SYSTEM
This following Part looks into how the Hong Kong
jurisprudence on cross-border arbitration has impacted the Mainland
China arbitration system through encouraging positive interaction.
The “positive interaction” refers to such trend that the Mainland
China arbitral authorities reflect on the enforcement judgments of
the Hong Kong courts and become persuaded to improve their rules
and practices to cohere with the high and internationally accepted
arbitration standards that Hong Kong maintains. However, this trend
of “positive interaction,” as will be explained subsequently, has
been slowed down, or even hampered, since Keeneye.
The Hong Kong Standard and Positive Interaction before
Keeneye
The experience of Hong Kong’s arbitration is impactful upon
the future reform of the rather young Mainland China arbitration
system.218 As explained above, ever since the signing of the Mutual
Arrangement, there have been signs of interaction of arbitration
practices, where the Mainland China side has traditionally been
more inclined towards adopting Hong Kong standards.
Obviously, of the two jurisdictions, Hong Kong’s arbitration
system is the more developed. First, Hong Kong adopted the
UNCITRAL219 Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration
as early as 1996 and has, since 2011, extended the Model Law to
govern both its domestic and international arbitrations.220 Being a
217
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Model Law jurisdiction, Hong Kong has the benefit of being able to
rely on a body of international arbitration jurisprudence and has
been placed in a significantly advantageous position in being able to
market its arbitration as being in line with international standards.
On the other hand, the Mainland China arbitration system, with its
first Arbitration Law published in 1994 and without subsequent
amendment thus far, has been described as being much influenced
by Chinese local standards and insufficient with respect to the
protection of party and tribunal autonomy.221 Second, Hong Kong
has a single, simple, and unified arbitration system, which Mainland
China does not have. In Mainland China, foreign-related arbitrations
and domestic arbitrations are treated very differently,222 and laws at
the national level are often very vague, leaving much room for
differences for laws and regulations from locality to locality or from
arbitral institution to arbitral institution.223 Third, in terms of public
policy standards, Hong Kong is more in line with international
standards. For example, regarding due process issues, Hong Kong
courts have adhered to the high standard set by the common law
which has been developed for centuries. In other respects though,
especially when dealing with non-domestic arbitration, courts in
Hong Kong do not shy from using foreign standards, such as other
common law practices, as well as other New York Convention
jurisdictions’ practices. In contrast, in Mainland China, public
policy carries a delicate and obscure definition, which refers to the
concept of “social and public interest.” 224 “Social and public
interest” in the Arbitration Law has remained a common criticism,
as Chinese courts sometimes try to review the merits of the award
under the pretext of local social and public interest such as local

the Model Law was extended to govern the domestic arbitration in Hong Kong. The
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protectionism concerns. 225 Moreover, there are no rule-of-law
traditions and there is little respect for due process and formal
dispute resolution procedures in Mainland China.
Although the arbitration system in Hong Kong is not without
deficiencies, the advantages outlined above should be respected and
protected, as they have played important roles in developing Hong
Kong into a regional and international hub for arbitration. To
emphasize, the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre, in its
promotional webpage, “Why Hong Kong?,” uses Hong Kong’s rule
of law, the common law system, its pro-enforcement courts, and the
fact that Hong Kong is a Model Law jurisdiction, as selling
points. 226 It is fair to say that when comparing the arbitration
systems of Hong Kong and Mainland China, Hong Kong has been
better off in many major aspects.
It would then seem sensible that interaction between the two
sides and of the cross-border arbitration regime towards the higher
standards which Hong Kong maintains would be more logical than
interaction the other way. Moreover, Mainland China, is as eager as,
or perhaps more eager than, Hong Kong to market its arbitration
regime as modern and international in order to attract foreign
business and investment. However, the vision of what makes a
modern arbitration system may not be shared in the same sense
across the border at different times.
Before Keeneye, the Mainland China arbitration authorities used
to pay much attention to the Hong Kong courts’ treatment of the
Mainland awards and respond to such judgments by reforming their
arbitration regulations to cater to the concerns of the Hong Kong
courts and towards the stricter due process standards applied in
Hong Kong. The desire and willingness to make a change is
predicated upon certain incentives seen from the Mainland China
arbitral authorities for modernization. Such type of interaction is
what we refer to in this Article as “positive interaction”.
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One of the examples of such positive interaction took place in 1994
when CIETAC revised its arbitration rules in response to the Paklito
judgment where the Hong Kong court refused to enforce the
Mainland China award on basis that the losing party was denied a
fair and equal opportunity of presenting their case on the expert
witness report. 227 Accordingly, Articles 26 and 28 of the 1988
CIETAC Rules were amended by Article 40 of the 1994 Rules,
which afforded parties the right not only to express their opinions
concerning an expert report, but also the right to require the experts
to appear in the hearing to explain conclusions.228 It was clear that
the CIETAC revision was in response to the Paklito case.
In 1998, CIETAC introduced further revisions to its arbitration
rules following an award challenged in the Hong Kong courts in
Hebei.229 In Hebei, the respondent complained that the presiding
arbitrator and expert witness appointed by the tribunal had inspected
allegedly defective equipment in the presence of the claimant’s
technicians but not the respondents. The award was subsequently
challenged as being tainted by apparent bias and in violation of
Hong Kong’s public policy. In the aftermath of the leading
judgment on Hebei, Article 38 of the 1998 CIETAC Rules
stipulated that, when investigating the facts and collecting evidence
by the tribunal itself, the tribunal should, if necessary, promptly
notify both parties to be present. 230 The 1998 revisions were
confirmed by CIETAC in its further amendment in 2000.231 In a
similar vein, as the flagship of locally-based arbitration institution in
Mainland China, 232 Article 44 of the 2001 Beijing Arbitration
Commission (the “BAC”) Rules was also amended to state: “[t]he
[t]ribunal shall deliver to the parties the evidence collected on its
227
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own initiative [and t]he parties may provide cross-examination
opinions in connection with the evidence collected by the
[t]ribunal.” 233 It was clear to everyone that these reforms were
drawn from the Hong Kong experience, in particular the Hong
Kong court’s criticisms of the lower standard and insufficiency of
due process in the Mainland China arbitration.
The abovementioned arbitration rule revisions are direct
responses to Hong Kong’s treatment of Mainland China awards by
Mainland China arbitration authorities. The reforms highlight a
great desire of the Mainland side to not have its arbitration seen as
sub-standard by the Hong Kong side in cross-border arbitral
relations, and show the willingness of Mainland China to update its
arbitration system towards the Hong Kong standard in order to
achieve that goal. The reforms also show that the cross-border
arbitration jurisprudence, all the way until Keeneye, has been clearly
in line with the higher and stricter standard shaped by Hong Kong
and the trend of interaction was an active and positive one where the
lower and the more-relaxed standard arbitration regime (i.e. the
Mainland China side) developed towards the higher and stricter
standard (i.e. the Hong Kong side).
Is this Positive Interaction Slowing Down?
As has been described in the previous section, in 2010, at the
CFI, Judge Reyes refused to enforce the arbitral award in the
Keeneye case, because the award was produced under apparent bias
due to various circumstances, including the fact that the same
arbitrator assisted in the mediation and “worked on” the parties.234
Unfortunately, in the following year, in late 2011, Tang VP at the
CA, reversed the decision of Judge Reyes, and held that there was
no apparent bias in the case and that the lower court should have
deferred to the Mainland China standard as applied by the
supervising court as to whether the arbitration was conducted
regularly or not.235
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In response to the Keeneye case, in its latest revision, CIETAC
revised its arbitration rules once again (which came into effect on
May 1, 2012), and notably, Article 45(8) of the 2012 Rules provides
some relief to the much criticized med-arb practice in Mainland
China. Article 45(8) provides:
Where the parties wish to mediate their dispute but do
not wish to have mediation conducted by the arbitral
tribunal, CIETAC may, with the consent of both
parties, assist the parties to mediate the dispute in a
manner and procedure it considers appropriate.236
Through the 2012 revision, if CIETAC, instead of the tribunal,
provides for the mediation process, it seems less likely that the medarb award would be tainted by apparent bias, as CIETAC is not
directly involved in the award-making process of the arbitration.
Conversely, the arbitrators may not directly get involved in the
mediation process. The latest CIETAC reform, therefore, appears to
allay the concerns in the Keeneye case (particularly regarding some
of the criticisms made by Judge Reyes), and to a certain extent
mirrors the approach of having the roles of mediators and arbitrators
assumed by different persons.237
However, the revised provision is arguably insufficient as both
parties need to be worried about bias such that they would agree to
what would obviously be a more expensive procedure. In reality, if
there is a likelihood of bias, it would be bias in favor of one party,
and that party would be unlikely to consent to the procedure
suggested by CIETAC’s revisions. Hence, although there is a
response to the Keeneye case, it does not seem to be a response
which would have satisfied the standard upheld in the CFI by Judge
Reyes. This is because, unlike the previous two revisions by
CIETAC in 1994 and 1998, the revised rules this time provide no
mandatory standard which the arbitrators/mediators have to observe
in a med-arb setting in order that the issue of apparent bias can be
avoided or at least mitigated.
Even more worrying, in the Keeneye case, the Mainland China
arbitral procedure which was involved and criticized was issued by
a locally-based arbitration institution, the Xi’an Arbitration
236
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Commission. However, that institution has thus far made no attempt
to either revise its arbitration rules, or provide clarifications on the
difficulties the Hong Kong courts had in interpreting its med-arb
procedures.238 It is reasonably believed that the quick deference to
the Mainland China standard of med-arb by the CA in Keeneye has
given the Mainland China arbitration institutions little incentive to
develop their standard of arbitration towards that of Hong Kong,
and may have thus slowed down the previous pace of positive
interaction of the arbitration systems across the border.
Despite the importance of the court’s pro-enforcement policy
towards the business community, it is advocated that there is value
when the Hong Kong courts refuse to bend to the more lax
standards of due process in Mainland China in cross-border
arbitration review and, rather, adhere to Hong Kong’s high standard
of justice and morality, which the Hong Kong courts see as
fundamental. This is because if deference is given towards a lower
standard of arbitration presently held in Mainland China or even a
specific locality in Mainland China, then a plethora of theoretical
and practical problems, not only with respect to Hong KongMainland China cross-border arbitral relations but also beyond,
could arise.
First, instead of maintaining a single standard of a particular
public policy rule in order for awards to be enforced in the region,
by deference, Hong Kong is transmitting the message that it has a
flexible and limitless number of standards. This causes much
uncertainty for parties wishing to challenge the enforcement of an
award. To challenge an award in Hong Kong, parties would have
the impossible task of first evaluating whether enforcing the award
would breach the public policy of Hong Kong, then whether such a
breach is offensive in the lex arbitri, then evaluate what level of
deference the courts in Hong Kong would give towards the opinion
of the lex arbitri, and finally, assess their overall chance of success.
Thus, absent a single standard, parties would be confused as to the
requirements of Hong Kong’s arbitration scheme.
Second, as the Hong Kong courts become more accommodative
towards awards which breach Hong Kong’s public policy but are
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The current Xi’an Arbitration Commission Rules in practice were issued in January
2008 and took effect in 2011. XI’AN ARBITRATION COMMISSION RULES,
http://www.xaac.org/laws_12.html (last visited July 12, 2013). No further amendments
have been introduced since Keeneye I, despite the wide criticism and debate the case
received.
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not offensive in the lex arbitri, those jurisdictions such as Mainland
China, would obviously have less incentive to reform their
arbitration systems towards the Hong Kong standard. Consequently,
the positive interaction of the cross-border arbitration system
between the two sides would be greatly hampered.
Third, by subjecting itself to Mainland China’s lower standard
of due process and informal dispute resolution practice, Hong Kong
would lose the identity and autonomy in setting up its own standard
in the cross-border arbitral order. As a result, Hong Kong will
gradually be downgrading itself from the international arbitration
center in the Greater China region to a local arbitration center
serving Mainland China interests. In retrospect, before Keeneye,
Mainland China had been looking upon the Hong Kong experience
to upgrade itself and align with international arbitration norms and
practices that Hong Kong maintains. Thus, it would be more
advisable to protect Hong Kong’s heightened standard.
Finally, Keeneye would either slow down the positive
interaction pace between the two sides previously in place, or even
to indicate a sign of negative interaction where Hong Kong is
diluting its autonomy, distinctiveness, and competitiveness as a rule
of law jurisdiction with English law foundations and becoming a
jurisdiction catering to Mainland China legal and arbitration status
quo. This may in turn harm the reputation of Hong Kong as an
international and regional arbitration center that the SAR
government has been working hard to maintain since the handover
and moreover, create an image that Hong Kong is developing
towards a localized arbitration service center for Mainland China.
Due to the abovementioned reasons, too quick a deference
towards Mainland China’s standard without properly and carefully
balancing Hong Kong’s own standard of public policy is concluded
as unwise, particularly because Mainland China had been
attempting to positively interact, converge, and harmonize its
arbitration system with that of Hong Kong over the years. Parties on
both sides have much to gain from a harmonized cross-border
arbitration system, but that harmonized system should be of a
proper type benchmarked against the higher arbitration standards
(i.e. positive interaction). The ultimate aim is that, through positive
interaction, parties and arbitral authorities at the Mainland China
side will improve themselves. They will have similar
understandings, expectations, and attitudes towards arbitration as
required under international norms and practices, which will in turn
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decrease conflicts on procedural and legal issues across the border,
increase the chances of settlement, and facilitate economic
integration in the Greater China region. Hong Kong should take
advantage of its developed rule of law and common law traditions
and has an important role to play in this positive interaction process.
In conclusion, Hong Kong should maintain its distinctiveness and
high standards in cross-border arbitration review so as to encourage
the continued positive improvement of the Mainland China
arbitration regime which is mutually beneficial to both jurisdictions
post-handover.
CONCLUSION
In the fifteen years since the sovereignty handover, much has
happened in the realm of cross-border arbitration in Hong Kong
with respect to Mainland China. The cross-border arbitration system
has seen its demise, rebirth, redevelopment and then Hong Kong’s
delicate discontent in recent years.
The demise came about when the New York Convention was
rendered inapplicable in July 1997 because of the sovereignty
handover, removing the basis of what was once a complete and
smoothly running mechanism for the mutual recognition and
enforcement of arbitral awards. Cross-border arbitration then went
into a two year limbo in which Mainland China awards were not
capable of being enforced in Hong Kong. With the application of
the Mutual Arrangement between Mainland China and Hong Kong
in 2000, the system was recreated by essentially redrafting the
provisions of the New York Convention into a bilateral agreement
between the two jurisdictions. Over the following years, the Hong
Kong courts rebuilt the system on basis of the former Convention
jurisprudence. The pro-enforcement policy during the Convention
era in Hong Kong was reinforced by the Hebei case, and parties
came to respect that the new cross-border arbitration system was
just as respectable and stable as the former Convention-based crossborder arbitration system with respect to Mainland China arbitral
awards.
However, with the arrival of the Keeneye case, the reinforced
stability of the cross-border arbitration system was undermined. The
case calls into question the once firm rule that it was the public
policy standard of the enforcement court (i.e. the Hong Kong court)

2013]

CROSS-BORDER ARBITRATION IN HONG KONG WITH CHINA

97

which is relevant in an enforcement challenge, and not that of the
seat of the arbitration or supervisory court (i.e. the Mainland China
court), although it requires the taking into consideration of the
views of the supervisory court such that only fundamental breaches
of justice and morality in Hong Kong can be valid grounds to refuse
to enforce an outside arbitral award. However, the Hong Kong
Court of Appeal judgment in Keeneye seems to suggest that Hong
Kong should instead refer itself and subject itself to the standards of
Mainland China in assessing the properness of arbitration even
when there are irregular awards with genuine issues of public policy
seeking enforcement in Hong Kong. Arguably, this approach could
keep enforcement rates high and might avoid the many conflicts
which would arise from all the potential procedural violations and
impartiality issues in Mainland China as a huge developing legal
system undergoing rapid economic transformation and with much
less respect for the rule of law and due process. However, as has
been strenuously argued, this perplexing judgment of Keeneye has
caused Hong Kong to lose much of its distinctiveness and
competitiveness in defining its own public policy and, in the
meantime, has slowed down or even hampered the positive
interaction trend in the cross-border arbitration development with
Mainland China. Although parties on both sides might gain from a
“China-centric” cross-border arbitration system, this Article argues
that the proper type of interaction bears much more value than the
interaction per se. The cross-border arbitration system should be
developed continuing the positive improvement and benchmarked
against the higher and internationally accepted standards of
arbitration that Hong Kong maintains (i.e. positive interaction). It is
unfortunate that the past pattern of positive interaction has been
slowed down or even hampered in most recent years. Where the
Mainland China arbitration institutions used to revise their
arbitration rules in order to display a visage that their arbitration
awards would be up to the standards of Hong Kong, now the Hong
Kong courts defer to the arbitration standards of Mainland China.
As such, the incentive for the Mainland China arbitration regime to
improve and reform itself towards the Hong Kong standards is
removed or diminished.
Despite this recent downturn, it is argued that the positive
interaction trend should be and will be resumed, as Hong Kong
seeks to maintain its image as an international arbitration
powerhouse with a strong rule-of-law, and Mainland China has
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made the improvement of its arbitration system a continued
endeavor for serving trade and investment interests.239 Streamlining
and improving the cross-border arbitration system will be critical
for both jurisdictions. In the long run, this synchronized crossborder arbitration consensus will bring about the healthy
development of legal cooperation and judicial assistance and gear
up economic growth in the Greater China region.
Last but not the least, the existing English-language literature on
Hong Kong’s relation with Mainland China post-handover, as in the
legal approaches generally, focuses mainly on the constitutional
order of “one country, two systems,” and to some extent, the role of
Hong Kong in the context of China’s booming economy and trade
internationalization. Little attention has been devoted to legal
interactions in the conflict of laws field and how Hong Kong could
contribute to Mainland China’s legal development, such as
engaging “positive interaction” and encouraging improvement of
rules and practices at the Mainland side through cross-border
judicial review over arbitral awards (as this Article has identified,
argued, and advocated). It is hoped that this Article can enhance the
academic sensitivity to the issues generated by the rapid
transformations in the field. It is further hoped that this Article can
contribute to, and stimulate greater interest in, the study of conflict
of laws between Hong Kong and Mainland China.
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The continued improvement of the arbitration system is important to the trade and
investment interests in China. On this point, see arguments in GU, supra note 8, at 197-209.

